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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Blake Ryan Davis appeals from his felony convictions for trafficking in heroin and
possession of Oxycodone and his misdemeanor convictions for possession of Suboxone,
and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officer Mayer contacted Davis in Davis’ bedroom regarding a person police were
looking for. (Tr., p. 129, L. 23 – p. 134, L. 5.) Davis appeared to be under the influence
of a controlled substance. (Tr., p. 134, Ls. 6-11.) The officer, with consent, searched
Davis’ backpack. (Tr., p. 135, L. 12 – p. 136, L. 9.) He found several knives and a lockbox.
(Tr., p. 136, Ls. 6-23.) In the lockbox he found 9.41 grams of heroin, Oxycodone pills,
Suboxone pills, paraphernalia and a significant amount of cash. (Tr., p. 137, L. 13 – p.
141, L. 5; p. 171, L. 8 – p. 183, L. 15; p. 225, L. 15 – p. 236, L. 8.; State’s Exhibits 2-13.)
The state charged Davis with the felonies of trafficking in heroin (seven grams or
more) and possession of Oxycodone, and the misdemeanors of possession of Suboxone,
and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 35-36.) The state also charged Davis with being
a repeat controlled substance offender. (R., pp. 46-47.) The case proceeded to trial. (R.,
pp. 79-92.) The jury returned guilty verdicts for possession of Oxycodone, possession of
Suboxone, and possession of paraphernalia, but hung as to the trafficking count. (R., pp.
129-30; Tr., p. 362, L. 9 – p. 364, L. 1; p. 371, L. 25 – p. 372, L. 20.) Davis pled guilty to
the enhancement. (Tr., p. 364, L. 14 – p. 369, L. 5.)
Davis later pled guilty to the trafficking charge pursuant to a plea agreement by
which the state agreed to recommend a sentence of 12 years with 10 fixed, to run
1

concurrently with any sentences imposed in relation to the prior convictions. (R., pp. 13442; Tr., p. 377, L. 10 – p. 392, L. 19.) The district court imposed concurrent sentences of
12 years with 10 years fixed for trafficking in heroin, seven years with two years fixed for
possession of Oxycodone, and 60 days each for the misdemeanors. (R., pp. 145-48; Tr., p.
402, L. 5 – p. 403, L. 19.) Davis filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of judgment.
(R., pp. 155-56.)
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ISSUE
Davis states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of
fundamental error in his closing arguments.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Davis failed to show error, much less fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
Davis Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Davis argues for the first time on appeal that it was prosecutorial misconduct to, in

closing argument, (1) use the term “doper” and (2) contend the state did not need “loads of
paperwork” to establish the reliability of the scales used in the state lab. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 4-10.) Davis’ argument fails for two reasons. First, in relation to the trafficking
conviction the argument is irrelevant because that conviction was pursuant to a guilty plea,
not the trial. Second, Davis has failed to establish any of the three prongs of fundamental
error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends

on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”

State v. Severson,

147 Idaho at 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2008). If a defendant fails to timely object at
trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245
P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

To show fundamental error an appellant must demonstrate

(1) a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, (2) that the error is clear and obvious
without the need to further develop the evidence regarding the error or whether the lack of
objection was a tactical decision, and (3) that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
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C.

Davis May Not Challenge His Guilty Plea Based On Alleged Fundamental Error
In The Preceding Trial
“A valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-

jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior
proceedings.” Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 832, 452 P.2d 54, 59 (1969). See also
Blackburn v. State, 161 Idaho 769, 773, 391 P.3d 654, 658 (Ct. App. 2017) (“Ordinarily, a
plea of guilty, if voluntarily and knowingly made, is conclusive as to the defendant’s guilt
and waives all nonjurisdictional defects in prior proceedings against the defendant.”). As
noted above, the first prong of a fundamental error claim is a showing of an unwaived
constitutional right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Because Davis entered a
guilty plea to the trafficking in heroin charge after the trial, he waived any alleged defects
in that proceeding. Davis’ guilty plea forecloses any claim of fundamental error in relation
to his trafficking in heroin conviction.

D.

Davis Has Shown No Fundamental Error By Use Of The Term “Doper”
The prosecutor, in rebuttal argument, twice used the term “doper.” First, the

prosecutor addressed the defense argument regarding Davis’ statement to officers denying
he had drugs, in part, by arguing: “Why do dopers do what they do? Why do drug users
do what they do? Who knows.” (Tr., p. 305, Ls. 22-25.) Later the prosecutor also stated,
“Again, who knows what dopers are thinking, right?” (Tr., p. 306, Ls. 13-14.) The context
of the argument was that Davis made inconsistent statements, initially denying to the
officers that he had drugs but admitting in later jail calls that he had the drugs. (Tr., p. 305,
L. 22 - p. 306, L. 18.) Davis argues that the use of this term “disparaged” him and the
defense argument. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)
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It is “improper for a prosecutor to use inflammatory words to describe the
defendant.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266, 233 P.3d 190, 197 (Ct. App. 2010). To
show that such argument rises to constitutional significance, however, the appellant must
show that the prosecutor has “attempt[ed] to secure a verdict on any factor other than the
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial,” such that
he is interfering with “a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry,
150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. Thus, although an argument that the defendant accused
of a sex offense was a “wolf” and a “predator” seeking someone “weak” because she was
“really young” “might be viewed as straying somewhat beyond comments on the evidence
and seeking to invoke sympathy or to arouse emotion,” it does not rise to fundamental error
because it was not so “inflammatory or egregious” as to risk a conviction on something
other than the evidence and the law. State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 304, 297 P.3d
257, 267 (Ct. App. 2013).
Use of the term “doper” did not rise to the level of being an effort to seek conviction
on a factor other than the law and the evidence, and was therefore not inflammatory in a
constitutional sense. 1 The evidence showed that Davis was in possession of a large amount
of heroin, as well as Oxycodone and Suboxone, and possessed paraphernalia for both
dealing and using heroin. (Tr., p. 137, L. 13 – p. 141, L. 5; p. 171, L. 8 – p. 183, L. 15; p.

1

Davis also argues that calling him a “doper” whose motives may therefore be hard to
fathom “ridicule[s] the premise” underlying his argument that granting permission to
search his backpack showed a lack of knowledge of the presence of the drugs. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 5-6.) However, rebutting Davis’ argument by pointing out that drug users do not
always act rationally and that their motives may be hard to discern, or that they might be
motivated to lie about their drug possession and even grant consent to search a backpack
in vain hope of allaying suspicion, is a proper rebuttal. Using the term “doper” did not
transmogrify this proper rebuttal into improper disparagement.
6

225, L. 15 – p. 236, L. 8.; State’s Exhibits 2-13.) The state also presented evidence that
Davis was under the influence of a controlled substance during the encounter with police.
(Tr., p. 134, Ls. 6-11.) Finally, the state alleged that Davis was both a heroin trafficker and
possessed other drugs. (R., pp. 35-36.) In short, there was overwhelming evidence that
Davis was a drug user and seller, the very definition of the slang term “doper.”
Davis argues the term “doper” is “purely pejorative” with “no justifiable alternative
understanding” such that, in “the context of this case, it was only meant to evoke an
emotional reaction.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) This argument fails because the entire case
was literally about whether Davis was a “doper” in the sense of someone who uses or deals
drugs. Merely using the slang term “doper” instead of the more clinical synonymous term
“drug user and trafficker” was not error, much less constitutional error.
Nor has Davis shown the alleged error is clear and the lack of objection not a tactical
choice. As noted above, the argument that it was not error is entirely plausible, and the
argument that it is constitutional error is weak. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7 (claiming
this case is analogous to cases concluding calling the defendant a “liar” was either error or
troubling, but not fundamental error).) Trial counsel may have intentionally made no
objection because he did not believe it would be sustained. Moreover, trial counsel may
have chosen forgoing making an objection that, if sustained, at best would have resulted in
a reformulation of the argument to use a more clinical term (“drug user” instead of
“doper”), and may have thus merely called more attention to the state’s argument.
Finally, Davis has shown no prejudice. Substituting the slang term “doper” for
“drug user” did not prejudice Davis at all, much less rise to the level of proving a reasonable
possibility that the error resulted in a conviction on prejudice rather than the evidence and
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the law. The evidence that Davis knew about the heroin, Oxycodone, Suboxone and
paraphernalia was overwhelming. The drugs and most of the paraphernalia were in a
lockbox to which Davis provided the combination. (Tr., p. 136, L. 24 – p. 137, L. 8.) The
lockbox was in Davis’ backpack (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 6-12), which was in Davis’ room (Tr., p.
209, L. 9 – p. 210, L. 16), where Davis was alone (Tr., p. 133, Ls. 18-19). When the officer
did not immediately recognize the dried (as opposed to the tar) heroin after its discovery,
Davis identified the substance as heroin and also described in detail the Oxycodone and
Suboxone2 pills. (Tr., p. 137, L. 23 – p. 141, L. 5.) Davis also admitted he possessed
heroin in later jail phone calls. (State’s Exhibit 21.) It was perfectly proper to argue that
Davis’ initial statements that there were no drugs in his room (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 6-10), made
before any search, did not create doubt about his knowledge of the drugs in part because
he was a demonstrated drug user and no one should therefore be surprised at the initial
denial.
Davis argues that using the term “doper” encouraged the jury to “emotionally reject
the defense argument about the knowledge element” creating a “taint” that was
“omnipresent in the jury room.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9. 3) The record does not support
the conclusion that it is reasonable to believe the jury decided the knowledge element

2

Another officer also found Suboxone strips on Davis’ dresser in his room. (Tr., p. 174,
L. 23 – p. 175, L. 7; p. 183, Ls. 6-15; State’s Exhibit 13.)
3
Davis also argues that because the jury “asked several questions about the evidence
regarding the alleged weight of the heroin” the alleged error cannot have been harmless.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) First, because this argument is relevant only to the heroin
trafficking charge it is foreclosed by Davis’ guilty plea which, as set forth above, waived
any claim of trial error related to this conviction. Second, although the jury’s questions go
to the weight element of the trafficking charge the actual questions were regarding purity.
(Aug., p. 1.) Davis has shown no connection between the alleged errors in the prosecutor’s
argument and the jury’s questions regarding the purity of the heroin.
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because the prosecutor used the term “doper” rather than on the basis of the overwhelming
evidence that Davis was not ignorant of the presence of heroin, Oxycodone, Suboxone and
paraphernalia in his lockbox in his backpack in his room.
The prosecutor’s use of the slang term “doper,” instead of calling Davis a drug user
and trafficker, was not error. Even if error it was not constitutional error, was not clear
error, and was not prejudicial error. Davis has failed to show fundamental error.

E.

Davis Has Shown No Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Argument About The
Accuracy Of The Scales Used To Weigh The Heroin
Davis contends the prosecutor committed fundamental error in rebuttal argument

addressing the adequacy of the evidence that the amount of heroin possessed by Davis was
more than seven grams. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.) At trial the lab analyst testified that
she weighed the two heroin packages on a “digital analytical balance” that was calibrated
by an outside agency and subject to monthly quality control checks and found a combined
net weight of 9.41 grams. (Tr., p. 226, L. 19 – p. 228, L. 3; p. 228, L. 22 – p. 229, L. 7; p.
229, L. 19 – p. 230, L. 1.) Davis’ trial counsel argued the evidence of weight was
insufficient because the state had not proven the scale was accurate. (Tr., p. 298, L. 16 –
p. 299, L. 10.) The prosecutor responded by pointing out that it was unlikely the scale was
so inaccurate that its measured amount of over nine grams was not sufficient evidence the
heroin weighed seven grams or more. (Tr., p. 304, Ls. 10-17.) The prosecutor also argued
it was “ridiculous to think that the state has to bring in loads of paperwork” to establish the
accuracy of the scales and that the expert’s reliance on the measures taken by the lab to
ensure the accuracy of the scales was sufficient. (Tr., p. 304, Ls. 18-24.)
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Davis’ claim of fundamental error fails because he waived any errors related to the
heroin trafficking conviction by his guilty plea. (Respondent’s brief, supra.) The evidence
of weight of the heroin was relevant only to the heroin trafficking charge and not the
charges of possession of Oxycodone, possession of Suboxone, and possession of
paraphernalia. Davis pled guilty to the heroin trafficking charge and therefore waived all
claims of trial error related to that conviction. Although there was no error in the
prosecutor’s argument regarding the adequacy of the evidence of the weight of the heroin,
even if there were error there was no fundamental error and Davis waived any claim of
error in the preceding trial by entering a guilty plea to that charge.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Davis’ judgment of conviction.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of July, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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